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The Priority Review Voucher Program at the FDA:
From Neglected Tropical Diseases to the 21st
Century Cures Act
Ana Santos Rutschman*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The priority review voucher program at the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) was established in 2007 to incentivize research and development
(R&D) in traditionally underfunded diseases.1 While shrouded in controversy
and criticism, the program has recently been bolstered by the passage of the
21st Century Cures Act,2 which prevented the vouchers from sunsetting in
late 2016 and furthered the overall scope of the program. 3 As it reaches the
end of its first decade, this Article discusses the impact of the program, with
a focus on recent developments. The Article builds on literature suggesting
that the voucher program has been ineffective in incentivizing research in
neglected diseases. It is the first to consider the expansion of the vouchers to
cover R&D on Ebola and Zika, arguing that the expansion was attributable
to misguided bipartisan political support and is likely to result in further
cross-subsidization benefiting R&D on mainstream diseases. Finally, this is
also the first scholarly piece to describe and assess the likely impact the 21st
Century Cares Act has on the program.
The process of developing and getting regulatory approval for a drug is
especially costly.4 The default mechanism for incentivizing innovation in
Jaharis Faculty Fellow in Health Law and Intellectual Property, DePaul University College
of Law. For helpful comments, I would like to thank Wendy Netter Epstein, Sam Halabi,
Katherine Macfarlane, Josh Sarnoff and Nadia Sawicki, as well as the participants in the Tenth
Annual Symposium on Health Law & Policy at Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
All errors remain my own.
1.
Ridley et al., infra note 16, at 313; Priority Review Vouchers: Overview,
http://priorityreviewvoucher.org/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
2. Jennifer Steinhauer & Robert Pear, Sweeping Health Measure, Backed by Obama,
Passes
Senate,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
7,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/07/us/politics/21st-century-cures-act-senate.html?_r=0.
3. Infra, Part IV.A.1.
4. A 2015 study puts this number at as high as $2.56 billion. See TUFTS UNIV., CTR. FOR
THE
STUDY
OF
DRUG
DEV.,
OUTLOOK
2015,
3
(2015),
http://csdd.tufts.edu/files/uploads/Outlook-2015.pdf [hereinafter TUFTS]. This might be an
overestimation. There is however no consensus on what the exact figures are, and the numbers
*

71

72

Annals of Health Law

Vol. 26

capital-intensive areas is the patent system, which has consistently been
regarded and lobbied for as a sine qua non of pharmaceutical innovation.5
But even the ability to set monopolistic prices for on-patent drugs is of little
avail in certain areas.6 The patent model reinforces the tendency of
pharmaceutical companies to focus R&D on drugs destined for markets with
“attractive investment returns.”7 Diseases that, in spite of a high social cost
and medical burden, affect small populations or that primarily affect
populations with limited resources receive scant R&D attention.8
However, other organizations and governmental agencies have provided
additional research incentives in the form of grants, exclusivities, vouchers,
and tax credits.9 For example, the FDA administers the priority review
voucher program. Congress designed the program and similar incentives to
help cure market failures in pharmaceutical innovation when patent
incentives alone are insufficient. The design of the program, however, is
idiosyncratic. The FDA awards vouchers to drug sponsors who obtain
regulatory approval for drugs treating qualifying, underfunded diseases. 10
Sponsors can redeem vouchers to speed up the approval process for a separate
drug application.11 The vouchers help sponsors get their drugs on the market
faster and, in turn, collect larger profits.12
Critics argue that the program fails to generate the type of innovative R&D
it purports to foster or to ensure the affordability of—and access to—drugs
approved under the program.13 Nevertheless, from a political point of view it
has cyclically enjoyed the bipartisan support that is so elusive nowadays, and
will vary according to type of drug or therapy. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy
Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1581, 1616, 1676 (2003) (noting how the “precise
statistics” of the costs associated with pharmaceutical R&D remain disputed).
5.
See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 346 (2007) (noting the role of the pharmaceutical industry
in perpetuating a patent-based system for drug innovation: “[t]he pharmaceutical industry,
lobbying for stronger patent laws throughout the world, has sung the praises of the patent
system as a means of promoting costly and risky investments in research and development
(‘R&D’).”).
6.
Ezekiel Emanuel, Don’t Only Blame Mylan for $600 EpiPens, FORTUNE INSIDERS
(Sept. 8, 2016), https://insiders.fortune.com/dont-only-blame-mylan-for-600-epipens6ad0065373e0#.p3gwrms23.
7. TUFTS, supra note 4, at 3.
8. Ridley et al., infra note 16, at 313.
9.
See generally Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes
Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303 (2013) (discussing the role of tax incentives in innovation policy);
Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property versus Prizes: Reframing the Debate, 81 U. CHI. L.
REV. 999 (2014) (discussing the government’s various rewards for innovation).
10.
See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the FDA’s voucher program as an incentives
mechanism).
11. See infra Part II.A.1 (explaining the R&D incentive of “blockbuster drug” sales).
12. See infra Part II.A.1.
13. See infra Part II.A.2.b.
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was legislatively expanded over time in both scope and duration.14 Moreover,
Congress recently passed the 21st Century Cures Act, which provides funding
for early-stage and “high-risk, high-reward” biomedical research and further
expands the priority review voucher program.15
Part I of the Article introduces the voucher program in the context of
innovation policy. Part II surveys the genesis, growth and shortcomings of
the program. Part III shows how the expansion of the program—following
the recent Ebola and Zika outbreaks, and into new fields—accentuates
misalignments between the vouchers and R&D incentives strategies. Part IV
explores the future of the program as affected by recent legislative changes,
as well as the emerging role of the FDA as a catalyst for innovation policy as
dictated by the voucher program.
II.

THE FDA’S VOUCHER PROGRAM AS AN INCENTIVES
MECHANISM
A.

1.

The Priority Review Voucher Program

The Voucher Program in the Context of Incentives Mechanisms

David Ridley, Henry Grabowski, and Jeffrey Moe first proposed the
priority review voucher program in Health Affairs article in 2006.16 The
catalyst for the proposal was the generalized lack of medicines available to
patients with infectious and parasitic diseases in the developing world.17 The
authors suggest that the FDA could be the touchstone of an incentives scheme
that would have pharmaceutical companies self-fund increased R&D in

14. See infra Part III.
15. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub.L. No. 114 – 255, § 2036 (2016) [hereinafter 21st
Century Cures Act]; see also Elaine Schattner, Why Patients Support the 21st Century Cures
Act,
FORBES
(Nov.
30,
2016,
9:54
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/elaineschattner/2016/11/30/why-patients-support-the-21stcentury-cures-act/#9143ceaac373 (citing funding for Precision Medicine Initiative and the
Cancer Moonshot as one of the main reasons for supporting the 21st Century Cures Act).
While both initiatives have been regarded favorably by patient advocacy groups and the
general public, the potential and actual efficacy of the Precision Medicine Initiative and the
Cancer Moonshot has been contested. Tabitha M. Powledge, That ‘Precision Medicine’
Initiative? A Reality Check, GENETIC LITERACY PROJECT (Feb. 3, 2015),
https://www.geneticliteracyproject.org/2015/02/03/that-precision-medicine-initiative-areality-check/; Jamie Condliffe, The Best—and Worst—Things About Joe Biden’s Cancer
Moonshot, TECH. REV. (Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602679/thebest-and-worst-things-about-joe-bidens-cancer-moonshot/.
16. David B. Ridley et al., Developing Drugs for Developing Countries, 25 HEALTH AFF.
313, 313 (2006).
17. Id. For a discussion of the market failures surrounding R&D for neglected diseases,
see Patrice Trouiller et al., Drug Development for Neglected Diseases: A Deficient Market and
A Public-Health Policy Failure, 359 THE LANCET 2188, 218891 (2002).
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neglected tropical diseases.18
With most companies engage in pharmaceutical R&D in the developed
world, particularly in the United States and Europe,19 Ridley et alia reasoned
that a way to bolster the development and commercialization of new drugs
and therapies for tropical diseases would be to tie the incentives for orphan
drugs to strategic and financial benefits for “blockbuster” drugs which
receive most funding for R&D. The scheme would partially add to R&D
funding for diseases prevalent in economically unattractive markets (the
markets of the developing world) from the traditional patent-based model in
which innovator companies recoup R&D costs through the sale of drugs
priced for more affluent populations.20
To implement the program in the United States, Congress created a list of
voucher-eligible diseases.21 When the sponsor of an eligible drug obtains
FDA approval, a voucher is issued granting “priority review” to a second
drug for which the sponsor might seek regulatory approval at a later time. 22
Under standard review, the FDA takes around ten months23 to review and
either grant or deny approval of new drugs and therapies.24 When a priority
18. Ridley et al., supra note 16, at 313.
19. Andrew Witty, New Strategies for Innovation in Global Health: A Pharmaceutical
Industry Perspective, 30 HEALTH AFFS. 118, 124 (2011). The Ridley et al. paper suggested the
adoption of a similar mechanism for Europe and, in 2011, David Ridley & Afonso Calles
Sánchez specifically described and proposed a European priority review voucher system.
David B. Ridley & Alfonso Calles Sánchez, Introduction of European Priority Review
Vouchers to Encourage Development of New Medicines for Neglected Diseases, 376 THE
LANCET 922, 922 (2010).
20. See Ridley et al., supra note 16, at 315 (describing the proposal’s goal to create a
market for financially “unattractive” diseases).
21. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing drug affordability).
22. Gaffney et al., infra note 34.
23. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR
SERIOUS
CONDITIONS
–
DRUGS
AND
BIOLOGICS
25
(2014),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Guidances/UCM358301.pdf (comparing the FDA’s
expedited goal to action within six months of receiving the application with its standard tenmonth framework) [hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY]; see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., TROPICAL DISEASE PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHERS GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 6 (2016),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidan
ces/ucm080599.pdf (stating, “FDA commits to a goal to review and act on 90 percent of
standard applications for N[ew] M[olecular] E[ntity] and original B[iologics] L[icense]
A[pplications] submissions within 10 months of the 60-day filing date.”) [hereinafter
TROPICAL DISEASE PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHERS].
24. Average review times also vary depending on type of drug and drug complexity. A
2014 study examined review times at FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
(“CDER”) and found “wide variance” among divisions, with Oncology and Antivirals
approving new drugs approximately three times quicker than the agency’s least efficient
divisions. Oncology and Antivirals took on average under 200 days to approve a new drug,
whereas the slowest division, Neurology, took close to 600 days. JOSEPH A. DIMASI ET AL.,
AN FDA REPORT CARD: WIDE VARIANCE IN PERFORMANCE FOUND AMONG AGENCY’S DRUG
REVIEW DIVISIONS 6, 8 (2014).
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review voucher is redeemed, the agency must attempt to bring that period
down to six months.25 Pharmaceutical companies benefiting from a voucher
are therefore able to enter the market four months earlier, reaping the
corresponding financial gains.26 The incentive to engage in R&D for
neglected diseases thus materializes in the form of sales of a second
(potentially blockbuster) drug.27 Short as this window of time may seem, for
the pharmaceutical industry, “four months of earlier market access could
translate into hundreds of millions of dollars.”28
In addition to the possibility of direct use, Ridley et alia suggested that the
vouchers should be transferable.29 As an alternative to entering the market
ahead of time, a voucher holder would be allowed to transfer or sell it to
another company.30 In the first iteration of the program, Congress chose to
restrict the number of times a voucher could be transferred, but the law was
amended to remove that limitation in 2014.31 To date there have been five
confirmed sales, ranging from $67 to $350 million.32
The combined transfers and sales of vouchers that have occurred since the
program was implemented in the United States provide an idea of the de facto
economic value of the vouchers. By extension, they should also help
delineate the profile of the incentive for companies to engage in R&D in
voucher-qualifying areas. For instance, Praluent, an injectable cholesterollowering treatment, and Odefsey, used to treat HIV-1 infections, have entered
the market with a voucher.33 In both cases, the voucher had been acquired
25.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FAST TRACK, BREAKTHROUGH THERAPY,
ACCELERATED
APPROVAL,
PRIORITY
REVIEW,
http://www.fda.gov/forpatients/approvals/fast/ucm20041766.htm (last updated Sept. 14,
2015) [hereinafter FAST TRACK] (“A Priority Review designation means FDA’s goal is to take
action on an application within 6 months.”).
26. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA’S EFFORTS ON RARE AND NEGLECTED DISEASES:
HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON AGRIC., RURAL DEV., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., AND
RELATED AGENCIES, COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE 6 (2010),
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA16/20130627/101069/HHRG-113-FA16-WstateGoodmanJ-20130627.pdf [hereinafter HEARING] (recording the statement of Jessie L.
Goodman, Chief Scientist and Deputy Commissioner for Science and Public Health, Food and
Drug Administration).
27. Id.
28.
FDA’s Efforts on Rare and Neglected Diseases, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN,
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm216991.htm (last updated June 23, 2010).
29. Ridley et al., supra note 16, at 322.
30. Id. at 317.
31. See infra Part III.B.
32. Infra Table 1.
33. FDA Approves Praluent to Treat Certain Patients with High Cholesterol, U.S. FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.
(July
24,
2015),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm455883.htm; Gilead
Sciences, Gilead Sciences Says U.S. FDA Approves Odefsey, REUTERS (Mar 1, 2016, 2:16
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSASC08EH3.
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from another company.34 In order to expedite review of Praluent, Sanofi
acquired the voucher from BioMarin at a price tag of $67 million, which
indicates that Sanofi expected returns in excess of that amount.35 In the case
of Odefsey, Gilead obtained the voucher from Knight Therapeutics for $125
million, which puts the estimated return over $130 million.36 Likewise, the
record-setting transaction in which United sold a (so-far unused) voucher to
AbbVie for $350 million indicates that, in the future, AbbVie expects to gain
approval for a drug that is likely to generate more than that amount after
entering the market four months ahead of standard review.37
Year
2014
2014
2015
2015
2016

Seller
BioMarin
Knight
United
Retrophin
Unknown38

Purchaser
Sanofi and Regeneron
Gilead
AbbVie
Sanofi
Gilead

Amount
$67 million
$125 million
$350 million
$245 million
undisclosed

Table 1: Priority Review Voucher Sales

FDA’s mission of ensuring the safety and efficacy of drugs39 is unlikely to
be compromised by the redemption of a voucher per se, as the agency
routinely engages in processes to expedite review of drugs deemed promising
outside the voucher context.40 The agency has different pathways to speed up
review of drugs that treat “serious medical conditions,” particularly in cases
where such drugs “are the first available treatment or if the drug has
34. Alexander Gaffney et al., Regulatory Explainer: Everything You Need to Know About
FDA’s Priority Review Vouchers, REG. AFF. PROF’LS SOC’Y (Nov. 3, 2016),
http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2015/07/02/21722/Regulatory-ExplainerEverything-You-Need-to-Know-About-FDA%E2%80%99s-Priority-Review-Vouchers/.
35. Id. (explaining that Sanofi expects returns in addition to the voucher user fee).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. In July of 2016, Gilead indicated that it had purchased a voucher, but did not make
public any information about the sale or plans for its use. See GILEAD SCIENCES, INC., CURRENT
REPORT
(FORM
8-K)
(July
25,
2016),
http://investors.gilead.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=69964&p=irolSECText&TEXT=aHR0cDovL2FwaS50ZW5rd2l6YXJkLmNvbS9maWxpbmcueG1sP2lw
YWdlPTExMDUwOTAzJkRTRVE9MCZTRVE9MCZTUURFU0M9U0VDVElPTl9FTlRJ
UkUmc3Vic2lkPTU3. Some commentators have raised the possibility that this might be the
voucher awarded earlier in 2016 to vaccine company PaxVax Bermuda for Vaxchora, a singledose oral cholera vaccine. See Gaffney et al, supra note 34.
39.
See What We Do: FDA Mission, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/ (last updated Apr. 4, 2017).
40.
See GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 23, at 1; see also infra note 41 and
accompanying text.
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advantages over existing treatments.”41 One of these pathways is known as
“priority review” and was created in 1992 by the Prescription Drug User Fee
Act.42 When a drug is granted priority review status, the FDA directs its
“overall attention and resources” to reviewing the application.43 In practice,
this translates into a shortening of the average review period from ten to six
months.44 The voucher program inscribes certain drug applications into an
existing category—priority review—for which these drugs might not have
otherwise qualified.
Although engaging in priority review is by now a routine process for the
FDA,45 shifting to priority review upon redemption of a voucher does have
an impact on the agency, which has been plagued by funding and staff
shortcomings since well before the voucher system was devised.46 In the
2006 paper introducing the concept of priority review vouchers, Ridley et
alia estimated that the “cost to the FDA of changing a drug’s status from
standard to priority is approximately $1 million” and proposed a voucher user

41. See FAST TRACK, supra note 25; For Patients: Breakthrough Therapy, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/forpatients/approvals/fast/ucm405397.htm (last updated
September 15, 2014) (Sponsors of drugs that “treat serious conditions and fill an unmet
medical need” may request fast track designation. Sponsors of drugs treating serious
conditions may request breakthrough therapy designation “when preliminary clinical
evidence indicates that the drug may demonstrate substantial improvement over available
therapy on a clinically significant endpoint(s).” Accelerated approval is available “for drugs
for serious conditions that fill an unmet medical need on whether the drug has an effect on a
surrogate or an intermediate clinical endpoint.”). As indicated above, priority review sets “a
goal date for taking action on an application within 6 months of receipt.” U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., REVIEW DESIGNATION POLICY: PRIORITY (P) AND STANDARD (S), MANUAL OF
POLICIES
AND
PROCEDURES
2
(2013),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/StaffPoliciesandProcedu
res/ucm082000.pdf [hereinafter P AND S POLICY MANUAL].
42. Id.; See also Ernst R. Berndt et al., Industry Funding of the FDA: Effects of PDUFA
on Approval Times and Withdrawal Rates, 4 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 545, 546 (July
2005).
43.
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
PRIORITY
REVIEW,
http://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/Fast/ucm405405.htm (last updated Sep. 15, 2014).
44. P AND S POLICY MANUAL, supra note 41, at 2.
45. See Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, Economics of New Oncology Drug
Development, 25 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 210, 216 (Jan. 2007) (discussing a 2007 study that
found that 71% of approved oncology drugs had received priority review, whereas for other
drugs the rate was 40%); John K. Jenkins, Regulatory Flexibility and Lessons Learned: Drugs
for Rare Diseases, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 12 (Oct. 18, 2016),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTob
acco/CDER/UCM525805.pdf (showing that during the 2008-2016 period (up to September 7,
2016) the number of NMEs approved under priority review was 75% for rare diseases and
30% for non-rare diseases).
46.
See, e.g., Charles Marwick, FDA Funding Problems Imperil Safety of Biological
Products in the United States, 279 JAMA 899, 901 (1998) (discussing the disparity between
the increase between the number of areas FDA has been called to regulate over time and the
amount of funding available to the agency).
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fee that would match or surpass that amount.47 For fiscal year 2017 the fee
has been set at $2,706,000 for all types of vouchers.48
Even if the user fee can compensate for the economic cost associated with
granting priority review in cases where the FDA might otherwise have denied
that status, it is still not enough to dispel all concerns about the impact the
program might have on the agency. These concerns are especially salient with
regard to autonomy in its agenda-setting, as described in Part IV.49
In spite of potential direct and indirect costs, the voucher program quickly
gathered political support.50 Senator Sam Brownback spearheaded the
incorporation of the program into the Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act (FDAAA), which was signed into law on September 27,
2007, a mere year and a half after the concept of the vouchers was first
introduced in a scientific publication.51 A second voucher program was
created in 2012, covering rare pediatric diseases, and the recently approved
21st Century Cures Act introduced a third voucher program, covering drugs
used to respond to bioterrorism or natural disasters (commonly known as
medical countermeasures).52
2.

Development of the Voucher Program

The priority review voucher program was created in 2007 “to stimulate
new drug development” in neglected tropical diseases.53 Eligible tropical
diseases are defined by a closed list, which originally encompassed 16
diseases, including tuberculosis, malaria, cholera and Human African

47. See Ridley et al., supra note 16, at 315, 318.
48. But see Zachary Brennan, Priority Review Voucher Fees to Decline in FY 2017, REG.
AFFS.
PROF’LS
SOC’Y
(Sept.
29,
2016),
http://www.raps.org/RegulatoryFocus/News/2016/09/29/25926/Priority-Review-Voucher-Fees-to-Decline-in-FY-2017/
(providing a comparison of 2016 to 2017 noting the decrease in fees for priority vouchers).
This is actually a decrease from FY 2016, in which the fee was set at $2,727,000. In 2011, the
fee for vouchers for tropical diseases was set at $4,582,000, rising to $5,280,000 in 2012 and
then declining to $3,559,000 in 2013. When pediatric disease vouchers were introduced (see
infra note 66) the fee was set to match the tropical disease fee at $2,325,000 in 2014, and there
has been fee parity for both programs ever since.
49. See infra Part IV.
50. See Sam Brownback, Eliminating Neglected Diseases: Impact of Published Paper,
26 HEALTH AFFS. 1505, 1509 (2007) (offering Senator Brownback’s support of a priority
review voucher program in Congress).
51. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 1102,
121 Stat. 823 (2007).
52.
What are Medical Countermeasures?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/EmergencyPreparedness/Counterterrorism/MedicalCountermeasures/A
boutMCMi/ucm431268.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2017); see also infra Part III.B.
53. Gaffney et al., supra note 34 (noting that section 1102 of the FDAAA created the l
Neglected Tropical Disease Voucher System).
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trypanosomiasis (commonly known as sleeping sickness).54 As detailed in
Part III, Ebola and Zika were not part of the initial list. The FDA has the
authority to add “[a]ny other infectious disease for which there is no
significant market in developed nations and that disproportionately affects
poor and marginalized populations,”55 a prerogative that the agency first used
in August 2015 to add Chagas and neurocysticercosis to the neglected
tropical disease voucher program.56 At the time, the FDA also created a
docket for public recommendations for further additions to the list.57
Additionally, the statute gives the FDA the authority to enforce
requirements and limitations on the use of vouchers. During the first seven
years of the program, the statute required drug sponsors to notify the FDA at
least 365 days before redeeming a priority voucher, a period that was
shortened in 2014 to a minimum of 90 days.58 Initially, transfers of vouchers
were also limited and could only take place once. In 2008, the FDA clarified
that “contractual arrangements such as the use of an option or transfer of the
right to designate the voucher’s recipient” were within the terms of the
statute.59 Since 2014, there have been no limits to the number of times a
voucher may be transferred,60 but a letter of transfer is required.61
The tropical disease vouchers may be used in combination with other
incentives initiatives or programs. For instance, a drug might qualify
simultaneously for the voucher and for orphan drug designation,62 which
would make it eligible for “marketing exclusivity and tax credits for qualified
clinical testing,” as well certain fee exemptions.63

54. 21 U.S.C. § 360n(a)(3).
55. TROPICAL DISEASE PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHERS GUIDANCE, supra note 23, at 4.
56. Designating Additions to the Current List of Tropical Diseases in Section 1102 of the
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 50559, 50559–65 (Aug. 25,
2015) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. p. 317), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-0820/pdf/2015-20554.pdf [hereinafter Additions to Tropical Diseases].
57. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA-2008-N-0567
(Nov. 5, 2008), http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/FDA-2008-N-0567-nhc.pdf.
58. 21 U.S.C. § 360n(b)(4).
59. TROPICAL DISEASE PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHERS GUIDANCE, supra note 23, at 5.
60. 21 U.S.C. § 360n(b)(2); see also TROPICAL DISEASE PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHERS
GUIDANCE, supra note 23, at 8 (explaining the FD&C Act and modifications).
61. TROPICAL DISEASE PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHERS GUIDANCE, supra note 23, at 8.
62.
Aarti Sharma et al., Orphan Drug: Development Trends and Strategies, 2 J.
PHARMACY
&
BIOALLIED
SCI.
290,
291
(2010),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2996062/
(An orphan drug can be defined as “is one that has been developed specifically to treat a rare
medical condition, the condition itself being referred to as ‘orphan disease.’”); see also 21
U.S.C. § 360bb (explaining voucher designation for rare diseases by the Secretary of Health
and Human Services).
63. TROPICAL DISEASE PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHERS GUIDANCE, supra note 23, at 10; 21
U.S.C. § 335a(o)(2)(a).
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So far, the FDA has awarded four vouchers for neglected tropical diseases.
The 2012 voucher awarded to Janssen (Johnson & Johnson) for Sirturo,64 a
bedaquiline-based drug used to treat multidrug-resistant pulmonary
tuberculosis, was the first tuberculosis drug to receive FDA approval in 40
years.65
Year
2009
2012

Company
Novartis
Janssen (J&)

2014

Knight
leishmaniasis
Therapeutics
PaxVax Bermuda cholera

2016

Qualifying disease
malaria
tuberculosis

Table 2: Priority review vouchers awarded for neglected tropical diseases, 20072016

Five years after the neglected tropical disease program was created,
Section 529 of the FDCA introduced a similar voucher-based incentives
program for rare pediatric diseases.66 FDCA defines rare pediatric disease as
one that “primarily affects individuals aged from birth to 18 years,”67 and an
FDA guidance on the pediatric voucher program further clarifies that a drug
qualifies for a pediatric voucher “if the entire prevalence of the disease or
condition in the U.S. is below 200,000 and if more than 50% of patients with
the disease are 0 through 18 years of age.”68
From the start, sponsors of qualifying pediatric drugs were required to
notify the FDA 90 days before using the voucher, and the transfer of pediatric
vouchers was never subject to limitations, as was initially the case with
tropical diseases.69 Pediatric vouchers may be used in conjunction with other
64.
Press Release, Johnson & Johnson, FDA Grants Accelerated Approval for
SIRTURO™ (Bedaquiline) as Part of Combination Therapy to Treat Adults with Pulmonary
Multi-Drug Resistant Tuberculosis (Dec. 31, 2012), https://www.jnj.com/media-center/pressreleases/fda-grants-accelerated-approval-for-sirturo-bedaquiline-as-part-of-combinationtherapy-to-treat-adults-with-pulmonary-multi-drug-resistant-tuberculosis.
65. See Katie Thomas, F.D.A. Approves Drug for Resistant Tuberculosis, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec.
31,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/01/business/fda-approves-newtuberculosis-drug.html (discussing the FDA’s approval for Situro as a new treatment for multidrug resistance tuberculosis).
66. 21 U.S.C. § 360ff.
67. 21 U.S.C. § 360ff(a)(3).
68. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., RARE PEDIATRIC DISEASE PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHERS,
GUIDANCE
FOR
INDUSTRY,
3
(2014),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM423325.pdf
[hereinafter PEDIATRIC VOUCHER GUIDANCE].
69. 21 U.S.C. § 360ff.
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incentives programs.70
A distinctive feature of the pediatric voucher program was that it gave the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) a year counting from the
awarding of the third rare pediatric disease priority voucher to “conduct a
study of the effectiveness” of the program.71 Specifically, GAO was to report
on:
(i) The indications for which each rare disease product for which a priority
review voucher was awarded (…);
(ii) Whether, and to what extent, an unmet need related to the treatment or
prevention of a rare pediatric disease was met through the approval of such
a rare disease product;
(iii) The value of the priority review voucher if transferred;
(iv) Identification of each drug for which a priority review voucher was
used;
(v) The length of the period of time between the date on which a priority
review voucher was awarded and the date on which it was used. 72

So far, seven vouchers have been awarded for rare pediatric diseases, at a
rate that is five times higher than the one for neglected tropical diseases.
Year
2014
2015
2015
2015

Company
BioMarin
United Therapeutics
Asklepion Pharma
Wellstat
Therapeutics
2015 Alexion
Pharmaceuticals
2015 Alexion
Pharmaceuticals
2016 Sarepta

Qualifying disease
Morquio A syndrome
High-risk neuroblastoma
Bile acid synthesis disorder
Hereditary orotic aciduria
Hypophosphatasia
Lysosomal
deficiency
Duchenne
dystrophy

acid

lipase
muscular

Table 3: Priority review vouchers awarded for rare pediatric diseases, 2012-2016
70. 21 U.S.C. § 360ff(g); see also PEDIATRIC VOUCHER GUIDANCE, supra note 68, at 1–2
(discussing how as with the tropical disease vouchers, diseases qualifying for pediatric
vouchers may cumulatively qualify for orphan drug designation and corresponding benefits).
71. 21 U.S.C. § 360ff(i)(A); see also infra Part II.B.
72. 21 U.S.C. § 360ff(i)(B).
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The original sunset provision established that the pediatric voucher
program would come to an end one year after the FDA issued the third
voucher for a rare pediatric disease.73 That third voucher was granted to
Asklepion on March 17, 2015 for Cholbam, a drug that treats patients lacking
enzymes to synthesize bile acid.74 In January 2016, Congress reauthorized
the program through September 201675 and a second short-term
reauthorization prolonged it until December 31, 2016.76 The 21st Century
Cures Act now extends the program until 2020.77 Drugs receiving rare
pediatric designation before October 1, 2020, will be eligible for a voucher if
approved before October 1, 2022.78
B.

Criticism of the Voucher Program

In theory, the revenue generated, either by direct redemption or sale of a
priority review voucher, functions as a reward in areas where traditional
incentives—such as patents—have failed to generate substantial innovation.
The prize-like benefit is justified as a mechanism to incentivize costly R&D
in areas with small disease populations, rendering them attractive to
pharmaceutical companies who would otherwise avoid markets that offer few
prospects of covering their investment. The particular appeal of the voucher
system is that, unlike other types of incentives,79 vouchers do not require any
direct financial support from the government or tax-based contributions. As
seen in the previous section, this feature renders them politically attractive
and has helped extend the life of the program.
To accomplish its goals,80 the voucher program must however produce two
interlinked yet distinct outcomes: 1) pharmaceutical companies should invest
in R&D for neglected and/or rare diseases as a direct result of the voucher

73. 21 U.S.C. § 360ff(b)(5) (“TERMINATION OF AUTHORITY.— The Secretary may
not award any priority review vouchers under paragraph (1) after the last day of the 1-year
period that begins on the date that the Secretary awards the third rare pediatric disease priority
voucher under this section.”).
74. See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves Cholbam to Treat Rare
Bile
Acid
Synthesis
Disorders
(Mar.
17,
2015),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm438572.htm
(explaining rare bile acid synthesis disorders and the hoped effect Cholbam will have on them).
75. Advancing Hope Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-229, § 1878, 130 Stat. 943, 946 (2016).
76. Press Release, Kids V Cancer, President Obama Signs the Advancing Hope Act to
Extend the Creating Hope Act to December 31, 2016 (Sept. 30, 2016),
http://www.kidsvcancer.org/president-obama-signs-the-advancing-hope-act-to-extend-thecreating-hope-act-to-december-31-2016/.
77. 21st Century Cures Act, § 2152.
78. Id.
79. Ouellette & Hemel, supra note 9, at 1008.
80. See TROPICAL DISEASE PRIORITY REVIEW VOUCHERS, supra note 23; see also Ridley
et al., supra note 16.
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incentive; and 2) if approved by the FDA, drugs and therapies for the diseases
targeted by the program should be made available to patients at prices they
can afford. Early evidence from the two existing types of vouchers suggests
that the current design of the program might not be conducive to achieving
either of these outcomes.
So far, there is a single formal evaluation of the vouchers—focusing only
on rare pediatric diseases—and that evaluation has contributed little to a
comprehensive assessment of the vouchers as incentives. Pursuant to 21
U.S.C. § 360ff(i)(A),81 in March 2016 the GAO issued a report that bears the
most self-explanatory of titles: Rare Diseases – Too Early to Gauge
Effectiveness of FDA’s Pediatric Voucher Program.82 The report raises
important questions, especially with regard to the effect of the program on
the FDA.83 The Agency expressed the view that the program:
adversely affects the agency’s ability to set its public health priorities by
requiring FDA to provide priority reviews of new drug applications that
would not otherwise qualify if they do not treat a serious condition or
provide a significant improvement in safety or effectiveness. Additionally,
FDA officials said that the additional workload from the program strains
the agency’s resources.84

However, the main conclusion of the report is that, given the extended life
cycle of drug R&D, the then 3-year-old pediatric voucher program had yet to
generate enough evidence to accurately assess whether the vouchers were
“encouraging the development of drugs for rare pediatric diseases.”85
In contrast with the findings of the report, commentators have been more
overt in criticizing the voucher program, in both of its current iterations.86 By
now, sufficient empirical evidence has emerged that it is possible to identify
and analyze trends shared by the pediatric and the tropical disease programs.
These trends suggest that it is unlikely that the vouchers are accomplishing
the goals for which they were designed. The following sections examine the
two-fold criticism of the program, starting with the problem of incentives to
increased R&D in voucher-eligible areas, and then turning to the question of

81.
82.

21 U.S.C. 360ff(i)(1)(A).
See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-319, RARE DISEASES: TOO
EARLY TO GAUGE EFFECTIVENESS OF FDA PEDIATRIC VOUCHER PROGRAM (Mar. 2, 2016),
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-319 [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
83. Id.
84.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., HIGHLIGHTS OF GAO-16-319, A REPORT TO
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES (Mar. 2, 2016), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-319
[hereinafter HIGHLIGHTS OF GAO-16-319].
85. GAO REPORT, supra note 82, at 9.
86. See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim, Drug Development for Neglected Diseases — The
Trouble with FDA Review Vouchers, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1981, 1981 (2008).
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availability of affordable drugs approved under the existing voucher
programs.
1.

Lack of R&D in Voucher-eligible Diseases

In April 2009, the FDA granted Novartis a tropical disease voucher (and
the first-ever priority voucher) for Coartem, an artemisinin-based
combination therapy for malaria.87 Artemisinin combination therapies are
consensually regarded as “generally highly effective and well tolerated” and
are the standard treatment recommend by the World Health Organization
(WHO) for uncomplicated malaria.88 When Novartis sought regulatory
approval for Coartem in the U.S., the drug had been in use for close to a
decade and was already registered in 85 other countries.89 Novartis stated that
it had been considering registering the drug in the U.S. before the creation of
the vouchers, citing “pressure from the U.S. Government and army to supply
traveling American citizens” as the main reason for registering the drug. 90
Similarly, in March 2014, Knight Therapeutics was awarded a neglected
tropical disease voucher after obtaining regulatory approval for Impavido, a
miltefosine-based drug used in the treatment of leishmaniasis.91 The bulk of
miltefosine R&D took place during the 1990s with funding from the WHO
and other institutions.92 Knight Therapeutics, while never involved in the
R&D process, went on to sell the voucher to Gilead for $125 million.93 These
two examples illustrate the disjointed dynamics of the program, with the
incentive-benefit being appropriated by players that do not engage in drugrelated R&D.94
87. Tatum Anderson, Novartis Under Fire for Accepting New Reward for Old Drug, 373
THE LANCET 1414, 1414 (2009).
88.
See WORLD HEALTH ORG., GUIDELINES FOR THE TREATMENT OF MALARIA THIRD
EDITION
16
(2015),
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/162441/1/9789241549127_eng.pdf.
89. See Anderson, supra note 87, at 1414.
90. See id.
91. Press Release, Knight Therapeutics, Inc., Knight Therapeutics, Inc., Announces FDA
Approval for Impavido (Miltefosine) for the Treatment of Visceral, Mucosal and Cutaneous
Leishmaniasis – Awarded Priority Review Voucher (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.gudknight.com/en/knight-therapeutics-inc-announces-fda-approval-for-impavido-miltefosinefor-the-treatment-of-visceral-mucosal-and-cutaneous-leishmaniasis-awarded-priorityreview-voucher.
92. Bernard Pécoul & Manica Balasegaram, FDA Voucher for Leishmaniasis Treatment:
Can Both Patients and Companies Win?, PLOS BLOGS (Jan. 20, 2015),
http://blogs.plos.org/speakingofmedicine/2015/01/20/fda-voucher-leishmaniasis-treatmentcan-patients-companies-win/.
93. Press Release, Knight Therapeutics, Inc., Knight Sells Priority Review Voucher to
Gilead (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.gud-knight.com/en/knight-sells-priority-review-voucherto-gilead.
94. Focusing exclusively on the pediatric vouchers, GAO has found that “each of the
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Signs that the industry is planning to reinvest voucher-money on R&D for
tropical or rare pediatric diseases are tentative at best. When interviewed
during the course of the pediatric program evaluation, representatives of
pharmaceutical companies that made money from the sale of a voucher told
GAO that they planned “to reinvest portions of the proceeds they received
into additional research on rare pediatric diseases.”95 However, all available
evidence indicates that drug sponsors are not investing in innovative R&D
for voucher-eligible diseases, but rather acquiring fully developed drugs and
bringing them to the FDA for review.96 To be sure, these companies still bear
the non-negligible costs of acquiring the drugs and of regulatory review, but
these are not the types of costs that the voucher program was designed to
cover. As per current practice, the program is subsidizing the non-negligible,
yet modest costs (by pharmaceutical industry standards) of bringing existing
drugs into the United States market. And, since there is no requirement that
voucher-money be used to fund R&D on voucher-eligible diseases, the drugs
so far approved through voucher priority review do not target niche or
underfunded areas.97
2.

Drug Affordability

Even if we were to settle for a system of vouchers that merely brings
existing drugs into the United States market, the no-strings-attached design

drugs awarded pediatric vouchers were in development prior to the voucher program’s
implementation. Any sponsors motivated by this relatively new program to attempt to develop
drugs for such diseases would likely be years away from submitting their new drug
applications to FDA.” GAO REPORT, supra note 82, at 9–10.
95. GAO REPORT, supra note 82.
96. Id.
97.
In 2011, Novartis unsuccessfully redeemed the voucher it was awarded for its
combination therapy for malaria. The company used the voucher to speed up review of a
biologics license application for Ilaris, a canakinumab-based treatment for gouty arthritis. The
Arthritis Drugs Advisory Committee at the FDA voted 11-1 against approving the drug.
Following voucher redemptions fared better; in 2015, Sanofi used a voucher and obtained
approval of Praluent, which is used to treat high cholesterol levels; in 2016, Gilead used a
voucher and obtained approval for Odefsey, used in HIV-1 infections; and also in 2016, Sanofi
again used a voucher and obtained approval for Soliqua, a combination therapy used in adults
with type 2 diabetes. All three drugs approved through a priority review voucher thus target
chronic and mainstream diseases. See Kurt R. Karst, Priority Review Vouchers – Not Much
Bang
for
The
Buck,
FDA
LAW
BLOG
(July
11,
2011),
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2011/07/priority-review-vouchersnot-much-bang-for-the-buck.html; Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves
Praluent to Treat Certain Patients with High Cholesterol (July 24, 2015),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm455883.htm;
and
Press Release, Sanofi, Sanofi Receives FDA Approval of Soliqua 100/33 for the Treatment of
Adults with Type 2 Diabetes (Nov. 21, 2016), http://www.news.sanofi.us/2016-11-21-SanofiReceives-FDA-Approval-of-Soliqua-100-33-for-the-Treatment-of-Adults-with-Type-2Diabetes.
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of the voucher program produces yet another undesirable result; there is no
law that ensures that voucher-redeemed drugs will become available to
patients at affordable prices.98 In the 2006 paper, Ridley et alia submitted that
“the incentive mechanism has little value if treatments are developed that do
not reach patients. The developer should work with global and local
stakeholders prior to FDA approval to ensure that the product will be used.”99
The caveat has two components: on the one hand, it is necessary to ensure
that the drug will be manufactured and distributed in the first place; on the
other, even when commercialized, voucher-sped drugs and therapies might
be priced at levels that generate substantial deadweight loss, and therefore, it
is also crucial to guarantee affordability of these drugs. Currently, however,
there is no legal mechanism to prevent pharmaceutical companies from
setting monopolistic prices for drugs for which they have successfully
redeemed a voucher. A case in point is Vimizim, the drug for which BioMarin
received the inaugural pediatric voucher—the same voucher the company
later transferred to Sanofi and Regeneron for $67 million.100 Vimizim costs
$380,000 a year per patient, an amount that puts it in the top five of the
world’s most expensive drugs.101 These numbers do not constitute an isolated
example. The two drugs for which Alexion was granted tropical disease
vouchers in 2015, Strensiq (for hypophosphatasia) and Kanuma (for
lysosomal acid lipase deficiency), have an annual cost of $285,000 and
$310,000 respectively.102
There have been proposals to require that pharmaceutical companies
guarantee affordable access to a drug before a voucher is awarded,103 but the
recently approved 21st Century Cures Act, which creates a new voucher
program, is silent on this topic.104

98. See Ridley et al., supra note 16, at 321.
99. Id.
100. GAO REPORT, supra note 82, at 12.
101. See Alex Philippidis, The High Cost of Rare Disease Drugs, GENETIC ENG’G &
BIOTECH. NEWS (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.genengnews.com/gen-exclusives/the-high-costof-rare-disease-drugs/77900055. Vizimim is expected to generate $400 million to $500
million in yearly revenue for the BioMarin; see Marvin M. Goldenberg, Pharmaceutical
Approval Update, 39 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 337, 337–38 (2014).
102. Amy Nordrum, Drug Prices: World’s Most Expensive Medicine Costs $440,000 a
Year, But is it Worth the Expense?, INT’L. BUS. TIMES, (Feb. 13, 2016),
http://www.ibtimes.com/drug-prices-worlds-most-expensive-medicine-costs-440000-year-itworth-expense-2302609.
103. See Pécoul & Balasegaram, supra note 92; see Cameron Arnold & Thomas Pogge,
Improving the Incentives of the FDA Voucher Program for Neglected Tropical Diseases
(Spring/Summer
2015),
https://www.brown.edu/initiatives/journal-worldaffairs/sites/brown.edu.initiatives.journal-worldaffairs/files/private/articles/Arnold%20and%20Pogge.pdf.
104. See Arnold & Pogge, supra note 103.
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III. RECENT EXPANSION OF THE VOUCHER PROGRAM
A.

Expansion of Eligible Tropical Diseases in the Wake of the Ebola and
Zika Outbreaks

As described in Part II, the FDA has the authority to expand the list of
tropical diseases that qualify for priority review vouchers by administrative
order.105 On two separate occasions, though sharing the same motivation,
Congress also added Ebola and Zika to the list. First, in December 2014, all
strains of filoviruses—the family that includes the Ebola virus—were made
voucher-eligible.106 This was accomplished a short four months after the
WHO declared the 2014 West Africa Ebola outbreak a public health
emergency. In April 2016, Congress again expanded the list to include the
Zika virus, only two months after the WHO declaration of public health
emergency.107
The addition of Ebola and Zika to the list of voucher-eligible neglected
tropical diseases is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it showcases the
goodwill associated with the voucher program. While Congress disagreed on
many aspects of the response to Ebola and Zika, delaying funding to address
both public health emergencies,108 it made each disease eligible for a priority
review voucher within months of the beginning of each outbreak.109 Second,
the inclusion of Ebola and Zika in the voucher program offers new evidence
of the misalignment between the incentives offered by the voucher program
and their impact on R&D in neglected diseases.110
For the purposes of the voucher program, Ebola and Zika are treated
similarly; both are tropical diseases lacking a vaccine111 and endemic to areas
105. See supra Part II. FDA added Chagas and neurocysticercosis to the list in 2015. See
Additions to Tropical Diseases, supra note 56, at 50, 559.
106. 21 U.S.C. § 360n(a)(2).
107. Press Release, Kaiser Family Found., House Approves Bipartisan Bill Adding Zika
To FDA’s Priority Review Voucher Qualifying Diseases List; President Obama Expected
To Sign (Apr. 13, 2016), http://kff.org/news-summary/house-approves-bipartisan-bill-addingzika-to-fdas-priority-review-voucher-qualifying-diseases-list-president-obama-expected-tosign/; see also Sarah Ferris, House Approves Bill to Speed Up Zika Drugs, THE HILL (Apr. 12,
2016), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/276045-house-approves-bill-to-speed-up-drugsfor-zika-virus.
108. See Alison Kodjak, Congress Ends Spat, Agrees to Fund $1.1 Billion to Combat
Zika,
NPR
(Sept.
28,
2016),
http://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2016/09/28/495806979/congress-ends-spat-over-zika-funding-approves-1-1-billion.
109. See S.2917 - Adding Ebola to the FDA Priority Review Voucher Program Act, infra
note 124; see Kaiser Family Foundation, supra note 107.
110. Kesselheim, supra note 86.
111.
See
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.,
Ebola
Virus
Disease,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs103/en/ (last updated Jan. 2016); see also
WORLD HEALTH ORG., Zika Virus, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/zika/en/ (last
updated Sept. 6, 2016).
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of the world with unattractive markets for mainstream biopharmaceutical
R&D.112 However, the viruses’ R&D histories are considerably different. In
the case of Ebola, as early as 2006, the Department of Homeland Security
assessed the virus as a “material threat to the U.S. population sufficient to
affect national security” and the Department of Health and Human Services
listed Ebola as a high-priority threat.”113 Furthermore, the linkage between
Ebola and bioterrorism has shaped the institutional makeup of players
involved in Ebola and filoviruses R&D, and by extension the amount of
funding. To give but a few examples, ZMapp, a “monoclonal antibody
cocktail,” was developed through a partnership between the Biomedical
Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA), the National
Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), the Department of
Defense, and California-based Mapp Biopharmaceutical.114 Several of these
entities, like BARDA or NIAID, entered multiple partnerships for different
products. For instance, BARDA also started funding the development and
manufacture of a recombinant vesicular stomatitis virus vaccine (rVSV)
against Ebola in late 2014.115 NIAID partnered with GlaxoSmithKline and
the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and funded vaccines targeting the
Zaire and Sudan strains of Ebola.116
The FDA was involved in the response to the Ebola outbreak and its
aftermath at different levels,117 from guidance drafting to clinical trials.118
Notably, the agency issued eleven emergency use authorizations for

See supra Part I.
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2015 PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY
MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES ENTERPRISE (PHEMCE) STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
8, 15, https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/mcm/phemce/Pages/2015-factsheet.aspx (last
updated Dec. 22, 2015) [hereinafter PHEMCE] (listing Ebola on the high priority threat list of
the Department of Health and Human Service’s “Public Health Emergency Medical
Countermeasures Enterprise Strategy and Implementation Plan”).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 16–17.
116. Specifically, the partnership funded a monovalent vaccine (cAd3-EBOZ) targeting
the Zaire strain of Ebola and a bivalent vaccine (cAd3-EBO) targeting the Zaire and Sudan
strains of Ebola. NAT’L INST. OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES, EBOLA: NIAID/GSK
INVESTIGATIONAL
EBOLA
VACCINE
(CAD3-EBOZ)
(Feb.
26,
2016),
https://www.niaid.nih.gov/diseases-conditions/ebola-vaccines.
117.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE: EBOLA
RESPONSE
UPDATES
FROM
FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/EmergencyPreparedness/Counterterrorism/MedicalCountermeasures/uc
m410308.htm (last updated Jan. 30, 2017).
118.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., VACCINES AND RELATED BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS,
BRIEFING DOCUMENT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING, LICENSURE OF EBOLA
VACCINES:
DEMONSTRATION
OF
EFFECTIVENESS
(May
12,
2015),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/BloodV
accinesandOtherBiologics/VaccinesandRelatedBiologicalProductsAdvisoryCommittee/UCM
445819.pdf.
112.
113.
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unapproved medical products or unapproved uses of approved medical
products to be used in Ebola R&D between 2014 and 2016.119 The FDA is
also co-sponsoring post-outbreak Ebola R&D. In May 2016, the agency
issued a $3.6 million contract to Stanford University to conduct studies on
survivors of the outbreak.120 But even with added institutional support arising
from biosecurity concerns—which Zika lacked—by the time Ebola vaccine
trials began, the number of reported cases had already began declining121 and,
as of early 2017, there is no approved vaccine.122
While the real question is whether the voucher program will be able to
incentivize future innovation on Ebola, Zika, and similar diseases, it bears
noting that the partnerships to speed up R&D on Ebola and Zika formed
before the inclusion of these viruses on the voucher-eligible list.A simple
look at the chronology of the response to Ebola puts the significance of
expanding the program to cover Ebola into perspective. The West Africa
outbreak began in March 2014, but the WHO did not declare it an emergency
until mid-August.123 Congress added Ebola to the voucher program in
December 2014.124 Meanwhile, the aforementioned recombinant vaccine
(rVSV) was licensed to an American pharmaceutical company in 2010,
received funding by BARDA in 2014-2015, and underwent phase I clinical
trials from late 2014 to early 2015.125 A bivalent vaccine (cAd3-EBO-Z) was
developed with partial funding from NIH and the NIAID and entered clinical
trials in 2014.126 Several other vaccine candidates followed similar
119. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATIONS: 2014 EBOLA VIRUS
EMERGENCY
USE
AUTHORIZATION,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/EmergencySituations/ucm161496.htm#ebola
(last updated Mar. 7, 2017).
120. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, SURVIVOR STUDIES: BETTER UNDERSTANDING EBOLA’S
AFTER-EFFECTS
TO
HELP
FIND
NEW
TREATMENTS,
http://www.fda.gov/EmergencyPreparedness/Counterterrorism/MedicalCountermeasures/M
CMRegulatoryScience/ucm500274.htm (last updated Jan. 31, 2017).
121. See Kai Kupferschmidt, Second Ebola Vaccine Trial May Be Too Little, Too Late,
SCI. MAG. (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/04/second-ebola-vaccinetrial-may-be-too-little-too-late.
122. There is however hope that a vaccine might soon reach the market. See Final Trial
Results Confirm Ebola Vaccine Provides High Protection Against Disease, WORLD HEALTH
ORG., (Dec. 23, 2016), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2016/ebola-vaccineresults/en/.
123. Media Centre Statement, World Health Org., Statement on the 1st meeting of the
IHR Emergency Committee on the 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa (Aug. 8, 2014),
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/ebola-20140808/en/.
124. See S.2917 - Adding Ebola to the FDA Priority Review Voucher Program Act; X
see also Public Law No: 113-233, Dec.16, 2014.
125.
J.A. Regules et al., A Recombinant Vesicular Stomatitis Virus Ebola Vaccine, NEW
ENG.
J.
MED.
330,
331
(Jan.
26,
2017),
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa1414216#t=article.
126. NAT’L INST. OF ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES, supra note 116.
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timelines.127 In all cases, partnerships formed before the tropical disease
vouchers expanded to cover Ebola and other filoviruses, and economic
resources mobilized before the voucher incentive. In the future, the sponsor
who obtains regulatory approval from the FDA to market an Ebola vaccine
in the United States will be able to collect the voucher reward—either by
using it to speed up review of another drug or by selling it.
The impact of the voucher program on Zika is identical, although the R&D
background is different. Even though the virus was identified in 1947,
science on Zika is significantly less developed than on Ebola.128 Before 2015,
Zika “was not considered to be a major pathogen,” but since the outbreak,
nearly 1,000 scientific publications on the virus have emerged. 129 Disease
complexity is not the only factor that has slowed down R&D in this area.
While linked to devastating problems like microcephaly, the virus is not
lethal like Ebola, is not associated with bioterrorism, and before
popularization of air travel was unlikely to spread in a meaningful way
outside endemic areas in the developing world.130
As of early 2017, there are at least 40 entities involved in the development
of a Zika vaccine.131 Some of these companies were or still are also involved
in Ebola R&D.132 Additionally, there is federal funding from the
NIH/NIAID133 and the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (Department
127. The remaining cases are VesiculoVax, MVA-BN Filo and AdVAdVac, DPX-Ebola,
Novavaxglycoprotein recombinant vaccine, VXA ZEBOV GP, the Rabies Vector vaccine,
Inovio’s Ebola vaccine, the Baculovirus Expression Vector System-derived Ebola vaccine,
GOVX-E301 and GOVX-E302. See William W. Fisher & Katrine Geddes, Learning From
Ebola: How Drug-Development Policy Could Help Stop Outbreaks of Infectious Diseases 17–
26 BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, GLOBAL ACCESS IN ACTION (GAiA) (Oct. 14,
2015), https://cyber.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/Learning_from_Ebola.pdf. All of these
vaccines received support from U.S. government agencies, with NIAID funding several
candidates.
128. See Jeff Lyon, Zika: Worse Than Thalidomide?, 319 JAMA 1246, 1248 (2016)
(discussing the areas on which long-term Zika research is still needed).
129.
See Alan D. T. Barrett, Zika Vaccine Candidates Progress through Nonclinical
Development
and
Enter
Clinical
Trials,
NPJ
VACCINES
(2016),
http://www.nature.com/articles/npjvaccines201623.
130.
See Daniel R. Lucey & Lawrence O. Gostin, The Emerging Zika Pandemic –
Enhancing Preparedness, 315 JAMA 865, 866 (2016) (contrasting the transregional
magnitude of the 2015 Zika outbreak with previous outbreaks).
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Matthew Patane, NewLink Genetics gets $8.1 million flor Ebola vaccine,
DES
MOINES
REG.
(Sept.
25,
2015),
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/tech/2015/09/25/newlink-genetics-ebola-vaccinedtra-money/72793540/; See Katie Thomas, The Race for a Zika Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/business/testing-the-limits-of-biotech-inthe-race-for-a-zika-vaccine.html?_r=0.
133. See NAT’L INST. OF ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES, HOW NIAID IS ADDRESSING
ZIKA VIRUS, https://www.niaid.nih.gov/diseases-conditions/addressing-zika (last updated Jul.
27, 2016).
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of Defense).134 At the time of writing, clinical trials are underway.135
Congress added Zika to the list of voucher-eligible diseases in April
2016.136 As with Ebola, there was no window of time for the voucher program
to possibly have any bearing on the R&D landscape that generated the current
vaccine candidates. Yet the program will reward sponsors of Zika vaccines
for gaining FDA approval. Even so, Congress rushed to approve the inclusion
of Zika on the tropical disease list—the same Congress that shortly thereafter
could not agree on funding for the domestic response to Zika, stalling the
reallocation of Ebola response funds, at a time when the Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) were running out of money to combat the spread of Zika.137
The expansion of the list of tropical diseases to include Ebola and Zika is
aligned with the architecture of the voucher program: it opens an additional
stream of incentives to two traditionally neglected diseases that are endemic
to markets of limited purchasing power. However, the condensed period of
time in which funders and innovators came together to enhance R&D on
Ebola and Zika sheds light on the fact that all resulting biopharmaceutical
innovation was completely detached from this type of incentives program.
Instead, that innovation was both hampered by pre-existing market failures
(like the pre-2015 concentration of Zika cases in neglected markets) and
driven by pre-existing incentives (like the role of bioterrorism in Ebola R&D
or the fear factor introduced by the high number of fatalities during the West
Africa Ebola outbreak and the congenital defects linked with Zika).
The issue therefore becomes one of assessing whether adding Ebola and
Zika to the voucher program is likely to encourage future R&D on these
pathogens. Whereas Ebola will likely maintain the status of high priority
threat,138 Zika ceased to be considered a public health emergency in
November 2016.139 Typically, post-emergency funding for outbreak diseases
decreases quickly.140 While the magnitude of the Zika outbreak will probably
134. See Gary Sheftick, Army Researchers Testing Zika Vaccine, U.S. ARMY (Jul. 6,
2016), https://www.army.mil/article/170960/army_researchers_testing_zika_vaccine.
135. Barrett, supra note 129.
136. See Clarke, supra note 107.
137. See Kelsey Snell, Another Failed Zika Vote Could be the Start of a Resolution,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
6,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/09/06/another-failed-zika-votecould-be-the-start-of-a-resolution/?utm_term=.4da19293bdc9.
138. PHEMCE, supra note 113; see also Orlando Cenciarelli et al., Viral Bioterrorism:
Learning the Lesson of Ebola Virus in West Africa 2013-2015, 210 VIRUS RES., 318, 319
(2015) (noting that, even though the West Africa outbreak is over, Ebola remains one the
major pathogens associated with potential bioterrorism threats).
139. See Lena H. Sun, WHO No Longer Considers Zika a Global Health Emergency,
WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-yourhealth/wp/2016/11/18/who-no-longer-considers-zika-a-global-health-emergency2/?utm_term=.96d5c724f0f2.
140. The WHO started reallocating Ebola funds to Zika even before the response to Ebola
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sustain interest and moderate funding for R&D for a while, domestic and
international focus will shift towards the next infectious disease.141 That
leaves the question of whether the vouchers are sufficiently powerful to
stimulate additional innovation around Zika and Ebola. As discussed in Part
IV, the economic footprint of the program appears to be too small to achieve
that goal.142
B.

The 21st Century Cures Act and Vouchers for Medical
Countermeasures

The FDA defines medical countermeasures as “products (biologics, drugs,
devices) that may be used in the event of a potential public health emergency
stemming from a terrorist attack with a biological, chemical, or
radiological/nuclear material, a naturally occurring emerging disease, or a
natural disaster.”143 The 21st Century Cures Act (“the Act”) creates a third
type of voucher program covering these products.144 The Act defines a
“material threat medical countermeasure application” as an application for a
drug that is intended “to prevent, or treat harm from a biological, chemical,
radiological, or nuclear agent identified as a material threat;”145 or “to
mitigate, prevent, or treat harm from a condition that may result in adverse
health consequences or death and may be caused by administering a drug, or
biological product against such agent.”146 Similar to the pre-existing
programs, vouchers for medical countermeasures are transferable, and there
is no limitation on the number of times they may be sold or otherwise
transferred.147 Drugs qualifying for the new voucher program may
cumulatively benefit from “any other incentive programs.”148 A temporal
limitation applies, however, as the program is scheduled to sunset on October
1, 2023.149

was completed, for instance.
141. Before Ebola and Zika, the WHO had issued two emergency declarations, one for
H1N1 (swine flu) in 2009 and another for polio in 2014. Other infectious disease outbreaks
never achieved that status, such as Chikungunya.
142. See infra note 153.
143.
What are Medical Countermeasures?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/EmergencyPreparedness/Counterterrorism/MedicalCountermeasures/Ab
outMCMi/ucm431268.htm (last updated Oct. 12, 2016).
144. 21st Century Cures Act, § 3086.
145. 21st Century Cures Act, § 3086 (a)(4)(A)(i).
146. 21st Century Cures Act, § 3086 (a)(4)(A)(ii).
147. 21st Century Cures Act, § 3086 (b)(2).
148. 21st Century Cures Act, § 3086 (e).
149. 21st Century Cures Act, § 3086 (g).
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IV. THE FUTURE OF THE PROGRAM
A.

Possible Fixes and Alternatives
1.

Existing Proposals

Most proposals to reform the voucher program focus on the two problems
described in Part III. The first is the lack of innovative R&D for diseases that
qualify for vouchers. In both the nearly decade-long tropical disease program
and the more recent pediatric program, the preferred modus operandi of
pharmaceutical companies seeking a voucher has been to avoid engaging in
costly R&D—the market failure that the vouchers were supposed to
attenuate—and instead bear the substantially lower costs of bringing existing
drugs (or versions that do not appear to be more effective) to regulatory
review. To counter this trend, there have been several calls for the recipient
of a voucher to be required to reuse part of the voucher money for R&D in
voucher-eligible diseases, or to “show some level of investment” in R&D
related to the voucher-qualifying drug.150 The way in which investment
would be determined—by what metrics and at what stage—remains to be
described in the literature. Other proposals try to address the question of
affordability in the context of the voucher program by suggesting that wouldbe voucher recipients should be required to agree ex ante to sell the drug at
affordable prices.151
A more radical approach would be to recognize that the voucher program
is indeed failing as an incentives mechanism for R&D in underfunded
diseases. As currently designed, the program is more likely to result in crosssubsidization of mainstream diseases than in innovative R&D for pathogens
like Ebola, Zika or rare pediatric diseases, as illustrated by the analysis of the
relationship between the addition of Ebola and Zika in the priority review
voucher program and the formation of Ebola and Zika R&D partnerships
during the recent outbreaks.152
Even when considering the prices fetched by the sales of vouchers in
recent years, and even if the program did not trigger any R&D or affordability
concerns, it might be that the program will always be too small to truly impact
allocation of R&D resources within the pharmaceutical industry. As Aaron
Kesselheim points out:
The prospect of a payment of as much as $350 million a decade or so in
the future may nevertheless be insufficient for large pharmaceutical
manufacturers accustomed to substantially higher revenues to change their
150.
151.
152.

See Kesselheim et al., supra note 86, at 1982.
See Pécoul & Balasegaram, supra note 92.
See supra Part III.A.
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investments to tropical or rare pediatric diseases. For instance, Sanofi,
which was involved in the purchase of 2 vouchers, reported revenues of
more than $43 billion in 2014.153

Against this backdrop, prolonging the life of the voucher program not only
reinforces the market failures that are left unsolved by the patent system; 154
it also perpetuates a system that is nominally cost-neutral to the FDA but that
in practice entails resource displacement and affects the agency’s prioritysetting agenda.155
Nevertheless, political support for the voucher system—rooted in a
misconstruction of the vouchers as cost-neutral drivers of increased R&D in
neglected diseases—does not appear to wane. Calls for the program to sunset
or be cancelled are likely to be futile, as they have been in the past.156 The
21st Century Cures Act supports this view, as described in the following
section. Given this scenario, if and when Congress revisits the voucher
program, it would be critical to at least mitigate the R&D and affordability
problems triggered by current practices. In particular, a requirement
establishing that a modicum of the revenue generated by the sale of a voucher
be redirected towards a voucher-eligible disease would be a first step, and
potentially not impossible to negotiate from a political standpoint.
Restrictions on the ability of sponsors to obtain a voucher by gaining FDA
approval for drugs already commercialized abroad should also be put in
place, although it might be harder to compromise on these restrictions.
Finally, making the vouchers conditional on price negotiations guaranteeing
affordability of drugs would also be desirable, although probably another
hard sell.
2.

Impact of the 21st Century Cures Act

The 21st Century Cures Act has been a controversial piece of legislation
throughout its drafting history, having been dubbed “one of the most-lobbied
health care bills in recent history, with nearly three lobbyists working for its
passage or defeat for every lawmaker on Capitol Hill.”157 The Act allocates
153. See Aaron S. Kesselheim, Experience With the Priority Review Voucher Program
for Drug Development, 314 JAMA 1687, 1688 (2015).
154. Trouiller et al., supra note 17.
155. See Witty, supra note 19.
156. In the past, some of these calls have come from the FDA itself. See John Carroll,
That Priority Review Voucher Program? The FDA Hates It, FIERCEBIOTECH (Mar. 3, 2016),
http://www.fiercebiotech.com/r-d/priority-review-voucher-program-fda-hates-it.
157. Sydney Lupkin, Legislation That Would Shape FDA and NIH Triggers Lobbying
Frenzy,
NPR
(Nov.
25,
2016),
http://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2016/11/25/503176370/legislation-that-would-shape-fda-and-nih-triggers-lobbyingfrenzy; see also Michael Hiltzik, The 21st Century Cures Act: A Huge Handout to the Drug
Industry Disguised as a Pro-Research Bounty, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2015),
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over $6 billion to fund medical research, but has drawn extensive criticism
over provisions that codify long-standing demands of the pharmaceutical
industry.158 Extensive portions of the Act affect the FDA,159 including the
process(es) through which the Agency reviews drug applications.160
As noted above, the Act also has a direct impact on the priority review
voucher program, namely by creating a new stream for medical
countermeasures.161 Moreover, the new legislation also makes some strides
in incorporating mandatory assessment mechanisms for all types of vouchers
(and not just for pediatric vouchers, as until now), as well as reinforcing the
idea that the vouchers are supposed to enhance innovation for neglected or
rare diseases. Section 3014 of the 21st Century Cures Act mandates that GAO
conduct a study of the multiple priority review voucher programs.162 The
resulting reports must be submitted to the Committee on Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions of the Senate and to the Committee on Energy and
Commerce of the House by January 31, 2020.163 Section 3014(c) provides an
exhaustive list of issues to be addressed by GAO. Among these, it is worth
highlighting the provision that mandates a determination of “whether, and to
what extent, the voucher impacted the sponsor’s decision to develop the
drug.”164 For drugs approved under the neglected tropical disease program,
the proposed legislation mandates a determination of whether the approval
or licensure of the drug addresses “global unmet needs” in the prevention or
treatment of tropical diseases.165 And, similarly for the rare pediatric diseases
voucher program, the report must present a determination of whether the
http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-21st-century-20161205-story.html;
Sydney Lupkin & Steven Findlay, Winners and Losers with the 21st Century Cures Bill, NPR
(Dec. 2, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/12/02/504139105/winnersand-losers-if-21st-century-cures-bill-becomes-law.
158.
See Russell Berman, Congress Nears a Breakthrough on Medical Research
Funding,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Dec.
1,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/cures-act-compromise-elizabethwarren/509228/ (describing criticism of the Act); see also Sam Stein, Matt Fuller & Ryan
Grim, Congress Is About to Pass A Bill That Shows D.C. at its Worst — It May Also Turn
Around the Opioid Crisis and Cure Cancer, HUFF. POST (Nov. 29, 2016),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/congress-21st-centurycures_us_583e3d98e4b0ae0e7cdaca32; Ameet Sarpatwari & Michael Sinha, The Current 21st l
Century Cures Legislation Is Still A Bad Deal For Patients, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Nov. 30,
2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/11/30/the-current-21st-century-cures-legislation-isstill-a-bad-deal-for-patients/.
159. 21st Century Cures Act, Title II.
160. For an overview of the FDA-specific provisions in the proposed Act, see Brennan,
supra note 48.
161. See Brennan, supra note 48.
162. See 21st Century Cures Act, § 3014 (a).
163. 21st Century Cures Act, § 3014 (b).
164. 21st Century Cures Act, § 3014 (c)(1)(B).
165. 21st Century Cures Act, § 3014 (c)(1)(C)(i).
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approval or licensure of the drug addressed an “unmet need.”166 If a priority
review voucher for medical countermeasures is approved, a similar
determination needs to be made, assessing whether approval or licensure of
a drug “affected the Nation’s preparedness against a chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear threat, including naturally occurring threats.”167 The
Act further emphasizes the need by establishing a separate requirement that
the GAO report assess “whether any improvements to such programs are
necessary to appropriately target incentives for the development of drugs that
would likely not otherwise be developed, or developed in as timely a
manner.”168 Collectively, these requirements are more stringent than the ones
that were in place after the GAO’s study of the pediatric voucher program.169
Catering to the concerns periodically voiced by the FDA about the impact
of the voucher programs on its resources, the Act also mandates an evaluation
of “the resources used by the Food and Drug Administration in reviewing
drugs for which vouchers were used, including the effect of the programs on
the Food and Drug Administration’s review of drugs for which priority
review vouchers were not awarded or used.”170
While the 21st Century Cures Act does nothing to directly address the two
main problems associated with the vouchers—lack of R&D on neglected
diseases and affordability—it does provide a better normative framework for
evaluating the successes and failures of the program as an incentives
mechanism. This modest improvement should facilitate informed debate
about the merits of the program in years to come.
B.

Revisiting the role of FDA as a locus for incentives policy

In addition to issues that are intrinsic to the awarding and use of the
vouchers, Congress’ use of an agency like the FDA as tool for innovation
policy raises further questions. The FDA has a storied role in pharmaceutical
innovation, but one that is primarily associated with its mission as a
gatekeeper: the main focus of the agency is to ensure that drugs are safe and
effective, a role that is undeniably shaped by underlying policy choices. As
Peter Barton Hutt has written, it “is difficult to find any significant issue faced
by FDA that is not ultimately a matter of policy, informed by both scientific
and legal considerations.”171

166. 21st Century Cures Act, § 3014 (c)(1)(C)(ii).
167. 21st Century Cures Act, § 3014 (c)(1)(C)(iii).
168. 21st Century Cures Act, § 3014 (c)(3)(B).
169. See 21 U.S.C. § 360ff(i)(1)(B).
170. 21st Century Cures Act, § 3014 (c)(3)(A).
171. Peter Barton Hutt, Historical Themes and Developments at FDA Over the Past Fifty
Years, FDA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE CHALLENGES OF REGULATING DRUGS AND
NEW TECHNOLOGIES 28 (2015).
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In addition to its gatekeeping function, the FDA also has explicit and
implicit roles in innovation policy, as demonstrated by Rebecca Eisenberg.172
For example, FDA regulation has become “an important adjunct to the patent
system in protecting innovating firms from competition in product
markets.”173 The types of market exclusivity that FDA regulation layers on
top (or, in some cases, in lieu of) patent rights directly impacts decisionmaking processes in the pharmaceutical industry, particularly at the level of
funding and R&D strategies.
But while the combined roles played by the FDA may and do effectively
shape the types of pharmaceutical innovation that we get,174 never has the
agency been called to partake in an incentives scheme as it does under the
voucher program. It is one thing to acknowledge that FDA regulation and
rulemaking is informed by policy and will, which in turn affect industry
behavior; it is another to use agency review as an integral component of the
economic incentive.
As described in Ridley’s 2006 paper and subsequently implemented, the
program purports to have no impact on the Agency because it is costneutral—that is, the economic cost of resource displacement is absorbed by
the fee paid by drug sponsors wishing to redeem the voucher. Moreover, the
90-day notification requirement ensures that the agency will have the time
necessary to adjust to an expedited timeline.175 Yet a simple budgetary
balancing act does not truly depict the extent of the impact of the voucher
program on the agency, which has been vocal about not endorsing the
vouchers.176 The GAO Report, albeit focused solely on pediatric vouchers,
made the agency’s position abundantly clear:
FDA officials stated that, while they strongly support the goal of
incentivizing drug development for rare pediatric diseases, they have seen
no evidence that the program is effective. The program’s authorization, as
amended, is set to terminate October 1, 2016, and FDA officials said they
do not support the program’s continuation. They expressed concern that
the program adversely affects the agency’s ability to set its public health
priorities by requiring FDA to provide priority reviews of new drug
applications that would not otherwise qualify if they do not treat a serious
condition or provide a significant improvement in safety or effectiveness.
Additionally, FDA officials said that the additional workload from the
program strains the agency’s resources. 177

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 346.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 346.
21 U.S.C. § 360n(b)(4).
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As the 21st Century Cures Act is implemented, the FDA will continue to
be part of an incentives scheme that the Agency finds contrary to its mission.
The impact and consequences of allowing private parties to influence Agency
goal setting has yet to be fully addressed in the literature and raises questions
that exceed the scope of the Article. Nevertheless, as new vouchers are
granted and redeemed, this is an area that deserves close monitoring.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although Congress acted with good intentions, the efficacy of the program
is questionable. GAO’s evaluation of the pediatric voucher program was
inconclusive, but evidence seems to suggest that most, if not all, drugs that
have received a voucher were already in development before each of the
voucher categories was implemented. In this sense, the incentive provided by
the vouchers is perversely diverted towards areas where there are fewer, if
any, shortages of R&D incentives. The current design of the program also
fails to ensure that drugs for which a voucher is redeemed are available to
patients at affordable prices.
Despite these shortcomings, the recent additions of filoviruses and Zika to
the list of voucher-eligible diseases, as well of the expansion of the program
to cover medical countermeasures, indicate that Congressional support for
the vouchers will likely endure. The 21st Century Cures Act is poised to
improve the parameters for evaluation of the program in future GAO reports,
but does little to solve the incentives problem at the core of the voucher
mechanism, or to address its affordability issues.
Finally, while it has been widely documented that current incentives for
R&D in low-burden diseases are subpar, co-involving the FDA in
experiments with alternative incentives models is not without its risks. The
program displaces Agency resources, arguably impacting the Agency’s
overall implicit and explicit innovation policies. It also brings into question
whether the FDA is the best locus for anchoring prize-type incentives, even
in indirect forms such as the voucher program.
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